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Legal indeterminacy comes in a variety of forms identified here as: (i) general legal 
indeterminacy; (ii) factual indeterminacy; and (iii) Mach/Feyerabend factual indeterminacy. 
The concept of general “legal indeterminacy” refers to problems in legal interpretation and 
has been extensively studied. “Factual indeterminacy” refers to the indeterminacy of facts 
as a matter of tax law when derived from separately indeterminate fields of law. “Mach/
Feyerabend factual indeterminacy” refers to fact words as derived from legal theory which 
provide the content for legal interpretation. The “facts” in tax law are not transcendent to 
law; in addition, the “fact” words of tax law cannot be simply imported from the field of 
economics. The incremental question of the origins of theory (as discussed by Karl Popper 
and Albert Einstein) is also analyzed here. The theory of tax law originates with “sympathy 
with experience” or “intellectual love” (tr. Einfühlung) of tax law by lawyers as reflected in 
the special heuristics and practices of the profession. Legal theory accordingly functions 
in similar fashion to scientific theory where a particular legal theory can be falsified (qua 
Popper) or understood in pluralistic terms by incorporating auxiliary ideas. 
Keywords: indeterminacy; legal science; Mach; Feyerabend; Popper.
Recommended citation: Bret Bogenschneider, Factual Indeterminacy in Interna-
tional Tax Law, 3(3) BriCs law Journal 73–102 (2016).
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Indeterminacy Thesis
3. Where Do Legal “Facts” Come From?
a. Feyerabend’s “observational language” versus everyday language
BRICS LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2016) Issue 3 74
4. Where Does Legal “Theory” Come From?
5. Legal Science and Indeterminacy
a. The Testing of Legal Theory by Theory
6. Conclusion
1. Introduction
The identification of “facts” is a critical aspect of legal interpretation. if the 
respective “facts” to which a law will be applied are not consistently determinable then 
legal outcomes may be indeterminate. But, the potential for factual indeterminacy 
is not what is meant by the general usage of the term “legal indeterminacy”. in the 
theory of positive law (particularly as relevant to tax law) “legal indeterminacy” refers 
to the potential for differing interpretations of a given law.1 For example, where the 
legislature did not contemplate a particular situation in drafting a law the codified 
result may then be indeterminate in application. Both legal realists and positive law 
scholars allow for the potential of legal indeterminacy.2 however, the question not 
normally addressed by positive legal theory is: Where do legal “facts” come from? 
here, the reference to “facts” means the fact words necessary to identify the “facts” 
relevant to legal interpretation under the law.3 as recently identified by mikhail 
antonov, Continental european positive law scholars have insufficiently addressed 
the pertinent question about the origin of legal “facts”.4 one proposal is that the 
1  See michael Potács, Legal Theory (Vienna: Kluwer, 2015), at ch. V, sec. a, pt. 2 (“even Kelsen stressed the 
exact opposite: ‘all previously developed methods of interpretation always lead only to a possible, not 
a single correct result.’ The assumption here is that legal positivism constitutes an objective meaning 
(or content) of legislation. however, this assumption does not exclude the possibility that the objective 
meaning of legislation is vague or indeterminate.”).
2  Karl n. llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: Some Lectures on Law and Its Study 26 (new York: Columbia 
university Press, 1930) (“is it not obvious that as soon as you pick up this statement of the facts to 
find its legal bearings you must discard some as of no interest whatsoever, discard others as dramatic 
hut as legal nothings? and is it not clear, further, that when you pick up the facts which are left and 
which do seem relevant, you suddenly cease to deal with them in the concrete and deal with them 
instead in categories which you, for one reason or another, deem significant?”); Cristoph möllers, 
Towards a New Conceptualism in Comparative Constitutional Law, or Reviving the German Tradition of 
the Lehrbuch, 12(3) int’l J. Constitutional law 603 (2014) (“Perhaps the most important element in the 
realist critique of legal concepts has stressed their indeterminacy. This is surprising because there is 
virtually nobody in the classical formalist era of ‘Begriffsjurisprudenz’ or common law formalism à la 
langdell to have claimed that legal concepts were determinate.”).
3  See infra part 3.
4  mikhail antonov, Systemacity of Law: A Phantasm? 3(3) russian law Journal 110 (2015) (“[T]he paradigm 
of interpretation of reality dictates, or is interrelated with, the paradigm of facts. in continental legal 
doctrine, the concept of a ‘legal system’ constitutes the predominant paradigm of interpretation, 
which in turn indicates that law shall be described and interpreted as a whole. even if this approach 
can appear intuitively correct within the continental legal paradigm, it remains basically devoid of any 
serious analytical evidence.”); see also Антонов М.В. О системности права и «системных» понятиях 
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content of legal “fact” words comes from the meanings of everyday language. and, 
since legal words have the meaning given in everyday language, positive law scholars 
are thus able to reject the theory of ernst mach (and refined by Paul Feyerabend) 
that words must derive their content from theory. 
some Continental scholarship says that legal “facts” correspond to everyday 
language, so if a positive codified law has words, the meaning of those words 
has some content because it is based on the everyday usage of language.5 and, 
that might very well be true in criminal law, for example. Yet, the countervailing 
thesis given here is that tax words do not correspond to everyday language. This is 
particularly true of the important tax words upon which international tax planning 
is conducted. Tax words are not derived from everyday language and often vary 
in meaning from colloquial usage; for example, a “hybrid” refers to something 
entirely different in everyday language usage taken in comparison to the usage of 
tax practitioners. The practical issue can then be given with a hypothetical where 
a statute is codified that says “all hybrids will be taxed at a rate of 20%.” one (of 
many) problems is the inherent issue of factual indeterminacy in the meaning of 
the word “hybrid.” even if an attempt to define the word were made in the positive 
law, in order to know the meaning of the word “hybrid” in situations not covered by 
the statutory definition (which in taxation often turns out to be all situations) one 
needs to be familiar with the theory of taxation. mikhail antonov (citing Wittgenstein) 
nicely explained the backdrop to this view as follows:
[l]aw is not a set of natural facts that can be inspected directly. rather, it is 
an “institutional fact” setting out a scheme of interpretation under which 
certain acts acquire a special meaning. That is why, according to macCormick, 
such facts are dependent on human activity. That assignment of meaning 
to a social fact (i.e., a speech or behavioral act) depends on the scheme of 
collective intentionality in general, and, for the sphere of law, on frameworks 
of legal reasoning in each particular legal community.6
The alternative is to say that uncovered factual situations are just “null” results 
under the positive law. To avoid such “null” results, the determination of “facts” must 
come from the legal theory of taxation and cannot be derived by some combination 
of positive law and everyday language taken in isolation. The additional question then 
в правоведении, 1 Известия высших учебных заведений. Правоведение 24 (2014) [mikhail V. 
antonov, On Systemacity of Law and on “Systemic” Notions in Legal Science, 1 news of higher educational 
institutions. legal studies 24 (2014)].
5  Potács 2015, at 21.
6  antonov 2015, at 117 citing neil macCormick & ota Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law: New 
Approaches to Legal Positivism (Boston: D. reidel Pub., 1986); ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations 198 (oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). 
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arises of: Where does legal “theory” comes from? and, notably, both Karl Popper and 
albert einstein addressed that question in identifying the origins of scientific theory.7 
The answer given here with respect to legal theory is effectively the same answer 
given in the theory of science. That is, legal theory comes from the intellectual love of 
tax law as reflected in the heuristics and specialized knowledge and practices of tax 
lawyers. as discussed in detail below, this is a different answer than that given by hans 
Kelsen (and as further developed by positive law scholars) who said that legal theory 
apart from positive law comprises “sociology” or something other than pure law. 
Factual indeterminacy in legal interpretation is not a “myth” in the context of tax 
law.8 in the field of taxation, tax planning is often premised on factual indeterminacy. 
so, the question given here: Where do legal “facts” come from? is really the central 
point of inquiry as a matter of the theory of tax law. a common issue in international 
tax law is the treatment of a legal entity classifiable either as a regarded entity (i.e., 
a corporation) or a pass-through entity (i.e., a partnership). This sort of classification 
issue was at one point so significant to tax law in the united states, the internal 
revenue service gave up on attempting to classify legal entities as a matter of fact 
and adopted the check-the-box regulations.9 under the check-the-box regulations, 
taxpayers can now elect the factual classification of the legal entity and thereby avoid 
legal indeterminacy as to entity classification. But, in the international context, legal 
entity classification is still a significant matter of international tax planning because 
the factual classification of an entity can be mismatched between jurisdictions. The 
seeking-out of factual indeterminacy is actually the primary activity of international 
tax planning. so, to the extent legal theory ignores factual indeterminacy, and focuses 
only on the positive law concept of general legal indeterminacy, such theory is 
mostly irrelevant to the actual practice of international tax law. as such, it is necessary 
to identify precisely the categories of indeterminacy that can arise under the law. 
There are at least three forms of indeterminacy in law. each are listed here with 
a brief explanation, as follows:
(i) legal indeterminacy (i.e., the meaning of the legal provision is subject to 
doubt).
llewellyn speaks of premises “mutually contradictory as applied to the case at 
hand,” and it is important to note that the clusters of premises he has in mind are not 
formal contradictories as, say, “Pacta sunt servanda” and “Pacta non sunt servanda” 
7  Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery 8 (2nd ed., Vienna: springer, 1935; reprinted: london: 
routledge, 2002) (“[m]y view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as 
a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. my view may be 
expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition.’”) 
citing albert einstein, Mein Weltbild 168 (amsterdam 1934) [= The World as I see It 125 (a. harris, tr., 
london: lane, 1935)].
8  John gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46(1) american J. Juris. 199 (2001).
9  internal revenue Code, 26 u.s.C. § 7701 (the “check-the-box” regulations).
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would be. The sort of cluster llewellyn has in mind is not of the form “P and not-P” 
but of the more complex form “if P then r and if Q then not-r.” Trouble arises only 
if “the case at hand” presents both P and Q and there is no metarule determining 
when to follow the “P” rule and when to follow the “Q.”10
here, “legal indeterminacy” means interpretational problems regarding the law 
itself with the fact words taken as given (perhaps derived from everyday language). 
This comprises the prior discussion of indeterminacy in the context of positive law 
and legal theory. 
(ii) Factual indeterminacy (i.e., the judge must find the facts to apply the positive 
law).
Factual indeterminacy in tax law is distinguishable from general legal 
indeterminacy. indeterminate fact patterns typically arise where a finding of 
a separate body of law, such as corporate law, is be taken as a matter of fact for the 
application of tax law. such situations are ubiquitous to tax practice and continuously 
arise in new and differing forms. The classic example is original issue Discount (oiD) 
where a bond is issued at a discount to par value, which creates factual indeterminacy 
as to the characterisation of such a discount as either interest income or capital gains 
(each with differing tax consequences). other frequent examples as a matter of 
international taxation include hybrid debt/equity arrangements, transfer pricing of 
intangibles, and hybrid entity mismatches.11
here, “factual indeterminacy” means the application of indeterminate law taken 
as “fact” from the perspective of tax law. This is, in part, the denial of the positive 
law synthesis idea where all law is taken together as one grand structure of which 
tax law is one component part. in tax law, we need to determine the application of 
some other substantive area of the law first, then, we proceed with application of the 
tax law. if the other area of the law is indeterminate (as positive law scholars admit 
that it is), then we have factual indeterminacy in respect of the tax law. The use of 
factual indeterminacy in international tax planning is now so ubiquitous this aspect 
of indeterminacy is probably beyond reasonable question in practical terms.
(iii) “mach/Feyerabend” Factual indeterminacy (i.e., the facts (or fact words) are 
dependent upon legal theory and special language). 
Taking all this into account we see that the theory which is suggested by 
a scientist will also depend, apart from the facts at his disposal, on the tradition in 
which he participates, on the mathematical instruments he accidentally knows, on 
10  William edmundson, The Antinomy of Coherence and Determinacy, 82 iowa l. rev. 4 (1996).
11  Bret Bogenschneider, Manufactured Factual Indeterminacy and the Globalization of Tax Jurisprudence, 
4(2) univ. College london J. law & Juris. 250, 251–252 (2015); see also Frans Vanistendael, Judicial 
Interpretation and the Role of Anti-Abuse Provisions in Tax Law in Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law 
132 (g.s. Cooper, ed., amsterdam: iBFD, 1997) (“The tax avoidance that is considered problematic 
typically occurs when factual situations are moulded in legal forms that bear less tax than would 
alternative forms.”). 
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his preferences, on his aesthetic prejudices, on the suggestions of his friends, and 
on other elements which are rooted, not in facts, but in the mind of the theoretician 
and which are therefore subjective… the freedom of theorizing granted by the 
indeterminateness of facts is of great methodological importance.12 
here, “mach/Feyerabend factual indeterminacy” refers to the origin of facts in 
the theory held by the practitioner or judge. so, if the legal theory changes then, 
by necessity, the “facts” also change. There is no transcendent idea of “facts”. This is 
also to say that the meaning of facts is indeterminate. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, the origin of the 
indeterminacy thesis is explored in the context of tax law. This frames the importance 
of the issue to the field of legal theory particularly given that various tax scholars 
have proposed importing the meaning of words from the field of economics. second, 
the question: Where do legal “facts” come from? is explored in detail. The conclusion 
based on mach/Feyerabend is that facts come from theory. Third, the question: 
Where does legal “theory” come from? is explored. The corollary issue is taken from 
Popper/einstein that theories arise from the german word Einfühlung (translated as 
“intellectual love”). here, the idea is the heuristics (i.e., specialized language) of the 
tax profession constitute the theory which gives rise to the “factual” content of words. 
Finally, the method of replacing legal theories is discussed in the context of tax law. 
2.  The Indeterminacy Thesis
Tax law is derived from many sources. This is true both in europe and the united 
states. and, that is simply to say in most countries an underlying tax code codifies 
a system of positive law, but the tax law also includes principles as determined by 
courts or the taxing authority in respect of particular cases. in the modern era, this 
observation is increasingly important for europe as the common law tax rulings of 
the european Court of Justice now overlay sharply positive law traditions in much 
of Continental europe;13 in the united states, extensive Treasury regulations are 
combined with broad enforcement discretion by the taxing authority, which is more 
characteristic of an inquisitorial legal system.14 The result is an extraordinary diversity 
12  Paul Feyerabend, Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers Volume 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge univ. Press, 1981); Paul Feyerabend, Knowledge, Science and Relativism: Philosophical Papers 
Volume 3 12 (J. Preston, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge univ. Press, 1999) (“a special feature of mach’s 
philosophy is that science explores all aspects of knowledge, ‘principles’ as well as theories, ‘foundations’ 
as well as peripheral assumptions, local rules as well as the laws of logic; it is an autonomous enterprise, 
not guided by ideas imposed without control from its own ongoing process.”); see ernst mach, Die 
Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psychischen (5th ed., Vein, 1906).
13  See nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, 20(3) Fordham int’l l. J. 656 (1996).
14  See Brian Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56(1) Florida l. rev. 1 (2004); Bret Bogenschneider, Foucault and 
Tax Jurisprudence, 8(1) Wash. u. Juris. rev. 59 (2015).
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of legal thought as applied within the context of international tax law. any reference 
to legal indeterminacy means that with this composite jurisprudence of taxation in 
the practice of international tax law outcomes are often unpredictable.15 
The legal training of tax lawyers is highly relevant to tax jurisprudence since such 
training will typically be undertaken either predominantly from a positive law or common 
law tradition thus reflecting ideas of legal realism. and, as was famously pointed out by 
William edmundson, the positive law tradition tends to favor determinative outcomes 
whereas the tradition of legal realism tends to favor coherent outcomes.16 edmundson 
explained as follows: “Two appealing ideas about law turn out to be in conflict. The first 
idea is that the law is or should be coherent... the law should or does make sense as 
a whole, hang together, or fit together… The second idea is that the law is or should be 
determinate… fixed and unambiguous.”17 many doctrinal debates between tax lawyers 
trained in the various traditions, such as the role of gaars (general anti-avoidance 
rules) reflect at least in part simply a preference for determinacy over coherence, or vice 
versa.18 Tax law is often taught by tax practitioners, and at least as an historical matter, 
this turns out to be significant because it reflects the distinction between the theories 
of legal realism of Karl llewellyn19 and empirical positive legal science of Christopher 
langdell20 (taken here in parallel to the german-language tradition of hans Kelsen).21 
15  See Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 nw. univ. l. rev. 1340 (1990); Chris Kutz, 
Just Disagreement, Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103 Yale l. J. 997 (1994); nikolas 
rajkovic, Rules, Lawyering, and the Politics of Legality: Critical Sociology and International Law’s Rule, 
27(2) leiden J. int’l l. 331 (2014). 
16  edmundson 1996, at 8.
17  Id. at 1–2; michael Waibel, Demystifying the Art of Interpretation, 22(2) european J. int’l l. 571, 576 
(2011) (“interpretation in international law is a legislative function… counterbalanced by the need for 
positivism to provide a measure of legal certainty in an international legal order often characterized 
by a lack of consistency, clarity, and completeness.”).
18  See Judith Freedman, Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the Intention of Parliament, 123 law 
Quart. rev. 53 (2007); Judith Freedman, Improving (Not Perfecting) Tax Legislation: Rules and Principles 
Revisited, 6 British Tax review 718 (2010); John avery Jones, Tax Law: Rules or Principles? 6 British Tax 
review 580 (1996).
19  edmundson 1996, at 4 (“llewellyn is making the simple point that deductive reasoning proceeds 
from premises and, in law, disputed cases typically involve a dispute as to which of two competing 
major premises should be given effect.”). 
20  See michael h. hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 american J. legal 
history 95 (1986); Thomas grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 Pitt. l. rev. 1 (1983); nancy Cook, Law as 
Science: Revisiting Langdell’s Paradigm in the 21st Century, 88(1) n. Dak. l. rev. 21 (2012).
21  hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Knight, tr., 2nd ed., Berkeley: university of California Press, 1967); 
hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 harv. l. rev. 44 (1941); Jochen 
von Bernstorff & Thomas Dunlap, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2011); see also Cook 2012, at 29–30 (“The basic principles underlying 
langdell’s pedagogy have been simply stated: law involves a scientific analysis able to reveal the life-
giving principles of the common law. This science of law could be advanced only by specially trained 
researchers – not practitioners – who were committed to disciplined analysis… like other sciences, law 
should be pursued under circumstances most conducive to scientific thought, viz., in a university rather 
than in the hurly-burly world of law offices and courts where law is learned, at best, unscientifically.”).
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notably, in his advocacy for law as empirical positive legal science langdell set out to 
exclude law practitioners from legal scholarship and instruction entirely.22 
To set the table on indeterminacy in tax law, let us first consider a general 
description of legal instruction in international tax law. if you were to sit in on a course 
in international tax law in nearly any country chances are the professor would at 
some point begin to draw intricate diagrams comprised of carefully-labeled boxes 
and circles on the board in the classroom, usually containing sets of arrows or lines 
connecting the boxes and circles. But, then, something else more important happens: 
From these diagrams the professor will begin to talk about tax law as applied to 
the boxes and circles; notably, the applicable tax law is mentioned only after the 
boxes, circles and arrows appear on the board. if the course is a matter of tax treaty 
interpretation the professor will refer to the articles of the applicable tax treaty as law. 
The law can be applied to the boxes and circles in a determinative or “correct” way and 
the purpose of the legal instruction is to explain that determinative legal analysis to 
reach the correct answer. however, problems arise where various provisions of law 
might seem to simultaneously apply to a certain set of boxes and circles. The professor 
will normally explain how logically to determine which provision of law to apply in 
that situation based on a certain method of legal interpretation. a test for the tax 
course will then ultimately be administered to determine if the student was able to 
apply the proper article of the tax treaty under a new and previously unknown fact 
pattern, for example. at least in european tax circles, the positive law instruction will 
usually also involve a brief mention of the countervailing approach of “normative” 
legal analysis.23 This is presented as the wrong way to do legal interpretation (i.e., to 
allow “policy” considerations to enter into the legal analysis). The Kelsenian argument 
reiterates that the delegates at the Vienna Convention precluded the consideration of 
“policy” analysis from the international interpretation of treaties. malgosia Fitzmaurice 
has published a considerable number of articles emphasizing this distinction between 
“policy” and “law,” with each article citing sir g. Fitzmaurice with the famous quote: 
This, of course, however excellent, is not law but sociology: and although the 
aim is said to be “in support of search for the genuine shared expectation of the 
parties,” it would in many cases have – and is perhaps subconsciously designed 
to have – quite a different effect, namely, in the guise of interpretation, to 
substitute the will of the adjudicator for that of the parties.24 
22  Cook 2012, at 29–30.
23  See george g. Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our “Interpretation” of It, 
65(2) american J. int’l l. 372 (1971).
24  See, e.g., malgosia Fitzmaurice, Review of Recent Books on International Law (r.B. Bilder, ed.), 104(2) 
american J. int’l l. 329 (2010); malgosia Fitzmaurice, Book Review: Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 
20 european J. int’l l. 952 (2009).
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so, every positive law-trained tax lawyer ought to know by now not to use the new 
haven school of legal interpretation because it ostensibly constitutes a violation of the 
rule of law.25 Prebble has famously taken this argument to an even further extreme by 
saying that tax words must correspond directly to natural law or economics to have any 
meaning, as everything else is “normative” or incomprehensible; “[T]he problem is that 
lawyers’ and accountants’ distinction between income and capital is not a distinction 
that is fundamental to natural law, nor to economics, for that matter.”26 Prebble takes 
this as true because any legal outcome whatsoever could result from such “normative” 
interpretation, thus representing a legal outcome the drafters of the tax code did 
not intend. For now, suffice to say, there is the potential for other methods of legal 
interpretation that might better account for the indeterminacy of law.27 as explained in 
detail below, this can be illustrated by reference to ernst mach’s and Paul Feyerabend’s 
description of science where a parallel issue is described in terms of positive science. 
The problem then arises in setting out to actually advise a client in legal practice 
(say, a multinational engaged in tax planning).28 on the instance of first setting out to 
advise the client, the process typically plays itself out as follows: (i) The new lawyer 
says to the client: “Please give me the diagram of boxes, circles and arrows and i’ll 
give you the correct legal answer on how much taxes you should pay.” The client 
then replies, “i don’t have any diagram, that’s exactly why i called you. i want you to 
construct the diagram so that i don’t have to pay taxes on the upcoming dividend 
payment.” The new lawyer must then begin to go about making the diagram and 
quickly discovers that the client must not be found to be in the standard factual 
25  Julian D. mortenson, The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History? 107 
american J. int’l l. 780, 781 (2013) (“rather, the delegates were rejecting myres mcDougal’s view of 
treaty interpretation as an ab initio reconstruction of whatever wise interpreters might view as good 
public policy. They objected to the purpose for which new haven school interpreters wanted to use 
travaux – not to drafting history as a source of meaning per se. To the contrary, the drafters repeatedly 
reiterated that any serious effort to understand a treaty should rely on a careful and textually grounded 
resort to travaux, without embarrassment or apology.”).
26  John Prebble, Why is Tax Law Incomprehensible? 4 British Tax review 380, 388 (1994) (“But the tax 
lawyer knows that the ultimate answers in taxation can never be found. it is the province of most legal 
scholarship to build a coherent intellectual discipline on foundations of tested and true principle. The 
tax lawyer tries to build a coherent intellectual discipline on foundations of sand and clay. That is the 
real challenge.”); but see Bret Bogenschneider, Wittgenstein on Why Tax Law is Comprehensible, 252(2) 
British Tax review (2015); see also Christian Zapf & eben moglen, Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule 
of Law: On the Perils of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein, 84 georgetown l. J. 485 (1996).
27  See nancy levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 58(3) Fordham 
l. rev. 263, 277–79 (1989) (“Classical analysis, according to the realists, failed to account for the 
indeterminacy of legal rules and the manipulability of legal reasoning. as a theory of science, classical 
analysis did not adequately account for changes in law.”).
28  See Jeffrey Waincymer, The Australian Tax Avoidance Experience and Responses: A Critical Review in Tax 
Avoidance and the Rule of Law (g.s. Cooper, ed., amsterdam: iBFD, 1997) (“university law courses tend 
to underplay the importance of facts. students are usually encouraged to concentrate on appellate 
court decisions and discern principles from them. however the nature of legal practice in general and 
the tax avoidance area in particular show how fundamental fact finding is to the judicial function.”).
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situation as then taxation will presumably result. The client is essentially authorizing 
the tax lawyer to structure the facts so as to be indeterminate by falling outside the 
typical “valid legal norm” under a set of facts. of course, this indeterminacy planning 
is what international tax planning is all about. 
any easy questions (i.e., where a tax treaty can be simply applied to avoid taxation) 
without re-structuring the facts are not the predominant part of international tax practice. 
gardner described the importance of the “null” (i.e., no valid legal norm on certain facts) 
result as follows: “if judges are professionally bound to decide cases only by applying 
valid legal norms to them, the argument goes, then there are necessarily some cases 
that they should refuse to decide, for there are necessarily some cases not decidable 
only be applying valid legal norms.”29 gardner then describes these as “gaps” in positive 
law adjudication (the idea of which is also applicable to tax planning). in international 
tax law characterized by manufactured indeterminacy planning by multinational firms 
the “gaps” between “valid legal norms” is effectively all international tax planning. so, as 
a practical matter, any easy questions are quickly resolved, and tax lawyers are working 
almost entirely on “gap” matters in tax planning. accordingly, all of the prior sets of boxes, 
figures and arrows previously contemplated by the new lawyer do not describe the set 
of facts the lawyer now encounters in the actual practice of law. 
so, what to do? at this point, if the problem involves tax treaty interpretation the 
new lawyer might go and look to the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties and 
finds it necessary to determine original intent as that is the determinative factor in treaty 
interpretation under the Vienna Convention. if the new lawyer is diligent she might also 
find various books or law journal articles that say how exactly to interpret articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention.30 This might include, for example, situations where 
the intent seems to have changed, or even to contemplate a situation where the parties 
did not have a common intent when the treaty was signed. Various commentators 
say if more than one article applies at the same time we apply the “crucible” approach 
where everything gets mixed together and then out from the crucible “pops” the 
determinative result (much like a piece of bread “pops” out of the toaster oven).31 But, 
this approach is strange because the fact pattern described here is entirely novel and 
it could not have been contemplated by the lawmakers in drafting the law.
29  gardner 2001, at 212.
30  ulf linderfalk, Is Treaty Interpretation an Art or a Science? International Law and Rational Decision Making, 
26(1) european J. int’l l. 169, 175 (2015) (“Despite the existence of articles 31–33 of the VClT, to some 
extent, issues of interpretation still have to be resolved at the discretion of the law-applying agents 
themselves. The crucial question is whether this makes treaty interpretation an art and not science. as 
i will argue in the following section, the answer to this question inevitably depends on the approach 
taken by each and every law-applying agent in disposing of the discretion given to her.”).
31  Fitzmaurice 2009, at 952 (“The ilC named this system of interpretation a “crucible” approach to treaty 
interpretation which it describes as follows: “[a]ll various elements, as they were present in any given 
case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interpretation would give the legally relevant 
interpretation.”); Fitzmaurice 2010, at 330.
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nonetheless even if we use the “crucible” approach this still does not render 
a strictly “positive” result at least from the perspective of the new lawyer. as far as 
the new lawyer is concerned, there was substantial doubt as to the legal outcome 
in her mind when she first encountered the problem. This causes a crisis for the new 
lawyer as she begins to realize that there is no “positive” outcome to the legal question 
at issue; the new lawyer is “free to choose” (as Jean-Paul sartre said) from a variety 
of potential outcomes in advising the client on questions of positive tax law.32 But 
the new lawyer does not want to be “free to choose” in classic sartrean terms. she 
does not want to tell the client that there is not a determinative legal outcome to the 
question at bar. The law is supposed to be determinate in application to “facts”; the 
legislature gave its pronouncement on all questions of law and that ought to be the 
end of the matter. and, this is merely to observe the tax law is not determinate. But, 
the common law-trained lawyer also suffers what might be called a reverse-“existential 
crisis” particularly in tax treaty interpretation. That is, in the case of the strange “null” 
result (e.g., double taxation, or, double non-taxation) – where a “null” means the treaty 
does not apply to the particular “facts” as given. For the common law-trained lawyer 
the “null” legal result is utterly baffling. The very purpose of common law is to resolve 
a novel legal problem in the ostensibly best manner; here, there is no potential to 
legally resolve a problem under the terms of the treaty at all. The lawyer is supposed 
to arrive at the best resolution of the legal problem.33 
We are now in a position to respond to Fitzmaurice (in a partial defense of the 
american system of legal interpretation) as it is premised on resolving issues of 
both legal and factual indeterminacy. Prior english-language discussions of “law-as-
sociology” either disregard the potential for indeterminate outcomes entirely, or refer 
to the first problem of “legal indeterminacy” and not “factual” indeterminacy. Kelsen’s 
discussion of “normative” legal interpretation is accordingly incomplete because the 
theory of legal realism as given by llewellyn deals in part with the second problem 
of factual indeterminacy (where the judge must find the facts in order to apply the 
positive law).34 Furthermore, at the end of the nineteenth century legal scholars in the 
united states first adopted the law as positive science method directly from german 
legal institutions;35 this was inspired by langdell who was the Dean at harvard law 
school at that time. langdell used the positive legal science methodology (including 
32  See Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings (s. Priest, ed., new York: Taylor & Francis, 2001).
33  See Kutz 1994 citing ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 65, 271–275 (Cambridge: harvard university Press, 
1986). 
34  Christoph Kletzer, Absolute Positivism, 42(2) netherlands J. legal Phil. 89 (2013) (“The validity and the 
content of the positive law cannot be derived from moral premises, then positivism present itself 
as a negative or relative position, i.e., as the rejection of certain normative relations of derivation. 
Positivism, understood in this way, first and foremost tells us what law is not.”).
35  Cook 2012, at 35 (“The german system, from which langdell borrowed, as well as other civil law systems, 
still approaches law as a set of fundamental norms which, by deduction, govern operative facts.”).
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the common law) to convince other scholarly disciplines within ivy league institutions 
that legal studies was a scientific discipline; the positive law doctrinal method of 
case law illustrated that the subject of law was really scientific and worthy of being 
included in the university curriculum. however, after the legal community succeeded 
in incorporating legal studies into the university curriculum this method of legal 
science was quickly abandoned. This was not done to abandon the “rule of law”; 
rather, the method was abandoned because it was not found to yield determinative, 
predictable, results since every case seemed to involve a new set of facts. 
accordingly, we need to begin any legal analysis by asking the question: Where 
do the facts come from? The “facts” that the lawyers or judge chooses to cognize 
are based on legal language and often determine the outcome of legal cases as 
a practical matter. 
3. Where Do Legal “Facts” Come From?
in the prior section the link between legal analysis and linguistics was formally 
given; legal “facts” come from language (i.e., linguistical methods) and language is 
to varying degrees malleable which allows legal words to function on an ongoing 
basis; Feyerabend wrote: “[a] language does not change by itself. it is a product of 
the human beings who speak it, and, therefore, it reflects the ideas, the views, and 
also the behaviour of those human beings.”36 in this respect, ulf linderfalk has very 
recently applied a linguistic approach to treaty interpretation under the Vienna 
Convention.37 in reviewing linderfalk’s theory, however, malgosia Fitzmaurice 
skeptically pointed out that linguistic meanings are not normally investigated in 
treaty interpretation;38 furthermore, linderfalk did not explain why he was engaged 
in linguistical analysis in treaty interpretation.39 The reason for linguistic analysis as 
explained by Feyerabend is that such is necessary for positive law interpretation 
because a true “stability thesis” for any positive law is unworkable in practice;40 as 
36  Feyerabend 1999, at 43.
37  linderfalk 2015, at 171 (“By the legally correct meaning of a treaty, international lawyers generally 
understand the communicative intention of the treaty parties – that is to say, the meaning that the 
parties intended the treaty to express.”).
38  Fitzmaurice 2010, at 332 (“The VClT’s textualism is also rejected by linderfalk in on the interpretation 
of Treaties. instead, he adopts an approach based on linguistics and pragmatics, using terms such as 
‘applier’ or ‘utterer,’ which are not commonly used in relation to treaty interpretation.”).
39  linderfalk 2015, at 172 (“The communicative intention of the treaty parties can only be assumed. 
Thus, the interpretation of a treaty is no different than the understanding of any verbal utterance 
produced by a person or group of persons, whether orally or in writing. as emphasized by modern 
linguistics (pragmatics), an utterance can be understood only on the assumption that whoever 
produced it acted rationally.”).
40  Feyerabend 1999, at 40 (“[o]bservation statements are statements which can be explained without 
reference to theories and whose meaning is also independent of changes in the ‘theoretical 
superstructure’… i call the claim that the meaning of observation statements is independent of 
change of theories the stability thesis.”). 
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he says, pure stability will cause the positive law terminology applied to become 
subjective in application. Feyerabend wrote: “We are forced to say (as is admitted by 
all positivists from Berkeley to ayer) that our elements turned out to be subjective: 
positivism sooner or later leads to subjectivism.”41 in simple terms, even the purest 
of positive law systems has to bend (or expand or contract) a little every time it gets 
applied to a new situation; even if two factual situations are held to be identical the 
meaning of the words has thus shifted to account for this equivalency. likewise, 
Feyerabend’s point in logical terms is akin to llewellyn’s in that if the positive law 
meant previously only P and Q (with no other implications), a determination that 
it either does or does not entail r must be subjective.42 accordingly, linderfalk is 
correct in that the shifting of the legal meaning of words is relevant to positive law 
interpretation; it represents the origin of “facts” into the context of legal theory.
The objective in identifying where “facts” come from in positive tax law is to 
try to move beyond Prebble’s idea that tax law should take its “facts” directly from 
a transcendent idea of sense-impression-words (tr. empfindungen) applicable to all 
human observations. in economic theory the link from sense impression to empirical 
knowing is Jeremy Bentham’s familiar theory of utility; the field of econometrics has 
further increasingly moved toward the idea of science as given by Francis Bacon.43 
Feyerabend of course rejected Bacon’s approach in the context of the philosophy 
of science.44 he wrote:
The principle of phenomenological meaning as well as the principle 
that descriptions are uniquely determined by facts will appear to be correct 
and Bacon’s philosophy will appear to be the only reasonable one… But 
this interpretation is not conferred upon them because they “fit”, but it is an 
essential presupposition of the “fitting”. This is easily seen when considering 
41  Feyerabend 1981, at 35.
42  This is setting aside the “null” result of tax treaty interpretation discussed above. 
43  Feyerabend 1981, at 42 (“according to the realistic interpretation, a scientific theory aims at 
a description of states of affairs, or properties of physical systems, which transcends experience not 
only insofar as it is general (whereas any description of experience can only be singular), but also 
insofar as it disregards all the independent causes which, apart from the situations described by 
the theory, may influence the observer or his measuring instrument.”); see also Feyerabend 1981, at 
212 (“First we find the facts (or, ‘phenomena’, in newton’s terminology). Then we derive laws. Finally, 
we devise hypotheses for explaining the laws. hypotheses and facts must be kept apart. it is not 
the imagination of the theoretician but the skill of the experimenter that determines what counts 
as a fact and how the facts are to be presented.”); sir Francis Bacon, Novum Organum 50 (J. Devey, 
ed., 1902).
44  Feyerabend 1999, at 99, 105 (“as is well known, there are empiricists who demand that science start 
from observable facts and proceed by generalization, and who refuse the admittance of metaphysical 
ideas at any point of this procedure. For them, only a system of thought that has been built up in 
a purely inductive fashion can claim to be genuine knowledge… Bacon and Descartes are quite 
explicit about their enterprise and they oppose common sense from the outset.”).
BRICS LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2016) Issue 3 86
signs whose interpretation has been forgotten; they no longer fit the 
phenomena which previously evoked their acceptance.45
Feyerabend also draws the general idea that a fully stable positivist system is 
totally content free (i.e., it does not cover any situation at all as a theoretical matter, 
as is often observed in the actual practice of tax law). he wrote: “[i]t is a theory 
or a general point of view which has been conserved because it appears to be 
phenomenologically adequate. The price we have to pay if we proceed in this way 
is that the chosen theory will finally be completely void of empirical content.”46 and, 
this links the current discussion back to the introduction of the new tax lawyer 
who encounters a client in legal practice. The positive legal knowledge the new 
lawyer qua scientist thought she had would not in actual practice cover the real legal 
situation. so, positive “facts” (whether in positive science or positive law) come from 
the malleability of language. The question then is how to incorporate a degree of 
malleability into positive legal language to avoid a subjective meaning of words.
a. Feyerabend’s “observational language” versus everyday language
new language formation can also be divided into borrowing from other disciplines 
versus created in a “local” context. Positivist scholars in tax law usually have in mind 
the particular defining of tax words; whereas Prebble has in mind borrowing tax 
words from natural law or economics. in either case, “[t]his procedure quite obviously 
presupposes that the meaning of the observational terms is fixed independently of 
their connection with theoretical systems.”47 The mach/Feyerabend thesis of factual 
indeterminacy is the rejection of the claim given in the prior sentence. as a matter 
of positive science (here positive law) such linguistics become the “observation 
method” of language to arrive at facts. Feyerabend wrote:
[l]anguage must satisfy in order to be acceptable as a means of describing 
the results of observation and experiment. any language satisfying those 
conditions will be called an observation language… the condition of 
decidability… secondly, it is demanded that in the appropriate situation 
the associated series should be passed through fairly quickly. This we call the 
condition of quick decidability.48
The immediate question is then how to define what positive law legal 
“interpretation” actually means. legal “interpretation” of course forms the basis for 
45  Feyerabend 1981, at 26–27.
46  Id. at 35.
47  Id. at 53.
48  Id. at 18.
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nearly all positive law tax analysis. if positive law applies a fixed set of legal terms such 
“interpretation” ought not to be necessary; the question might be posed as whether 
“interpretation” is intended to mean something like “translation”. Feyerabend specified 
that legal interpretation actually means the specification of additional conditions 
to applying “observational language.” he wrote: “any complete class of such further 
conditions will be called an interpretation. a particular observation language is 
completely specified by its characteristic together with its interpretation.”49
and, Feyerabend appears to be exactly correct if we look to linderfalk’s theory 
of treaty interpretation; linderfalk expressly began to specify linguistical rules for 
positive law “interpretation” (and listed them as purported interpretational “rules”). 
linderfalk wrote:
rule 1: if a treaty uses elements of conventional language (such as, for 
instance, words, grammatical structures, or pragmatic features), the treaty 
shall be understood in accordance with the rules of that language. rule 2: if 
one of the two possible ordinary meanings of a treaty provision makes a part 
of the treaty redundant, whereas the other ordinary meaning does not, then 
the latter meaning shall be adopted. rule 3… [and so on].50
This setting out to identify the “rules” of positivist legal “interpretation” leads 
directly to the proposal for “everyday language” where the transcendent rules will 
be layered over the transcendent facts. in the terms of Feyerabend, as explained 
in detail below, michael Potács said that everyday language is the applicable 
“observational language” for positive law.51 however, as discussed in detail below 
Feyerabend expressly rejected for positive science what Potács proposed for legal 
theory. Feyerabend wrote:
at this stage is seems appropriate to make a few remarks about the role 
of everyday language in scientific practice. it has been frequently asserted 
that the language in which we describe our surroundings, chairs, tables and 
also the ultimate results of experiment (pointer-reading) is fairly insensitive 
towards changes in the theoretical “superstructure.” it seems somewhat 
doubtful whether even this modest thesis can be defended; first, because 
a uniform “everyday language” does not exist. The language used by the 
“everyday man” (whoever that may be) is a mixture of languages, as it were, 
49 Feyerabend 1981, at 19.
50  linderfalk 2015, at 174. 
51  Feyerabend 1999, at 21 (“[a]n observational concept is a concept which is constructed so that a singular 
statement which contains only this concept is not only arrived at immediately, without reflecting on it 
at all, but is also a statement which does not require further justification other than pointing out that 
a certain observation was made. observation statements are certain, not hypothetical.”).
BRICS LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2016) Issue 3 88
i.e., it is a means of communication which has received its interpretation from 
various and often incompatible and obsolete theories. secondly, it is not 
correct that this mixture does not undergo important changes: terms which 
at some time were regarded as observational elements of “everyday language” 
(such as the term “devil”) are no longer regarded as such.52
Feyerabend further rejected even the idea that “everyday language” could allow 
for “interpretation”. he continued:
it also becomes clear that the analysis of everyday language cannot 
provide us with an interpretation either. 
on the basis of the foregoing discussion we may now tentatively put 
forward our thesis I: the interpretation of an observation language is determined 
by the theories which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon 
as those theories change.53
To next apply this philosophy of science to legal theory, Potács declined to apply 
the mach/Feyerabend thesis, and argued instead that legal language is always 
imbued with theory because the legal words correspond to everyday language. 
Potács argument is that legal words are not generally ascribed different meanings 
other than ordinary meanings. Potács identified the importance of this line of 
reasoning in the context of legal theory. he wrote:
This situation is referred to… as “transcendence of perception” that there 
is no uninterpreted visual sense-data, no “facts” (empfindungen: translated as 
“sense data”) for the purposes of mach. What sets legal analysis apart is that it 
is “always given,” law is already interpreted theoretically, decrypted, imbued 
with hypotheses. The theories in the empirical sciences as the natural or social 
sciences (economics and sociology) is only a continuation of this practice of 
everyday knowledge. 
But, that claim is obviously contrary to that given by Prebble in the context of 
tax law, where Prebble claimed that the words of tax law were so far removed from 
ordinary meanings that it rendered the tax law incomprehensible to lay persons.54 
Bogenschneider subsequently gave the Wittgensteinian response to Prebble that 
the meaning of tax words was determined by the heuristics of the tax profession. 
But, this also constitutes a de facto rejection of Potács argument for the positive law 
52  Feyerabend 1981, at 30–31.
53  Id. at 31. 
54  Prebble, supra note 26.
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in the context of legal theory because the claim is that the “foreign language” of tax 
words may not be understandable to laypersons. The next point of investigation 
then is if tax “facts” do not come from everyday language and instead come from 
legal theory, then where does “legal theory” come from?
4. Where Does Legal “Theory” Come From?
The mach/Feyerabend thesis is that “facts” are not separable from theory.55 The 
origin of “facts” is legal theory including positive legal science (as discussed in further 
detail here). Therefore, it is potentially fruitful to discuss the origin of scientific theory 
as a matter of the philosophy of science since this parallels the origin of legal theory 
and the origin of “facts.” however, in the first place there cannot truly be a wholesale 
importation of words from the field of economics into taxation without substituting 
also the theory of economics for the theory of taxation. rather, the “facts” (and also 
the meaning of words) are malleable and determined by changes in legal theory; 
“[The] argument against meaning invariance is simple and clear. it proceeds from 
the fact that usually some of the principles involved in the determination of the 
meanings of older theories or points of view are inconsistent with the new, and 
better, theories.”56 simply put, as legal theory changes this also changes the words 
of tax law. 
The practice of setting out specialized (i.e., “stable” word meanings) in positive-
law tax research may limit the usefulness of that research to future scholars if the 
meaning of words necessarily shifts. however, the use of defined words is a tacit 
rejection of the everyday language meaning in the context of taxation. new legal 
ideas that shift the meaning of words are not provide by “facts”, but by legal theory. 
Feyerabend wrote: “interpretations of this kind could not possibly emerge from 
close attention to the ‘facts.’ it follows that we need a non-observational source for 
interpretations. such a source is provided by (metaphysical) speculation which is 
thus shown to play an important role within realism.”57 
nonetheless, some tax words are given in ordinary language. This dichotomy 
within tax law represents the further distinction between “common” and “abstract” 
theories as explained by Feyerabend (given here as the difference between Potács’ 
conception of public law and Prebbles’ conception of tax law). Feyerabend discussed 
further as follows:
55  Feyerabend 1999, at 16 (“a concept is a theoretical concept if in order to determine the truth-value of 
a singular statement which contains it, theories, in addition to observations, are also required. To be 
brief and imprecise, an observation statement is accepted (or rejected) by merely looking (or listening, 
etc.). a theoretical statement is accepted or rejected by looking and thinking (calculating).”).
56  Feyerabend 1981, at 82.
57  Id. at 36.
BRICS LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2016) Issue 3 90
What has just been said applies most emphatically to the relation between 
(theories formulated in) some commonly understood language and more 
abstract theories. That is, languages such as the “everyday language,” that 
notorious abstraction of contemporary linguistic philosophy, frequently 
contain (not explicitly formulated, but implicit in the way in which its terms 
are used) principles which are inconsistent with newly introduced theories, 
and they must therefore either be abandoned and replaced by the language 
of the new and better theories even in the most common situations.58
however, if tax law is more consistent with Potács’ conception of everyday language 
as imbued within legal theory, then we would need to observe tax terminology that 
has a colloquial meaning. The Prebbles also object to any malleability because they 
see a shift in word meanings as a violation of the rule of law;59 that issue was also 
addressed by Craig latham in response to Prebble along pragmatic lines.60 To simply 
continue with Bogenschneider’s helpful example of “original issue Discount” (oiD) 
in the tax context – referring to a bond issued below par value – this does not at all 
comprise ordinary or everyday language usage imbibed with theory. rather, the 
words “original issue discount” are meaningless outside the tax context; furthermore, 
in parallel fashion the concept to which oiD refers, i.e., “discounted bond” are 
meaningless in the context of taxation without reference to the tax concept of oiD. 
The point is, the special tax words “oiD” actually are at once the legal theory but the 
words are not ordinary; this is worth repeating: Special tax words are imbued with 
legal theory but the words do not arise from everyday language. 
The conclusion that special tax words do not arise from ordinary language changes 
the prior results of general legal theory because Potács’ rejection of ernst mach on 
the grounds of everyday knowledge falls apart. so, as explained by Feyerabend in 
the context of positive science, theory is necessary in order to arrive at the meaning 
of words; “theories shape and order facts.”61 Feyerabend wrote: “[F]actual adequacy 
can be asserted only after it has been confronted with alternatives whose invention 
and detailed development must therefore precede any final assertion of practical 
success and adequacy. This, then, is the methodological justification of a plurality 
of theories.”62
58 Feyerabend 1981, at 78.
59  rebecca Prebble & John Prebble, The General Anti-Avoidance Rule and the Rule of Law in John Prebble, 
Ectopia, Formalism, and Anti-Avoidance Rules in Income Tax Law in Prescriptive Formality and Normative 
Rationality in Modern Legal Systems (W. Krawietz et al., eds., Berlin: Duncker and humblot, 1994).
60  Craig latham, A Tax Perspective on the Infrastructure of Regulatory Language and a Principled Response, 
1 British Tax review 65, 73 (2012).
61  Feyerabend 1999, at 183.
62  Id. at 80.
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an alternative source of legal theory other than setting out definitions of word or 
importing tax words from economics (qua Prebble) is accordingly required for tax law 
which is of course legal theory. legal theory is hence strictly necessary for taxation; 
and, it will not suffice to simply set out a set out a series of “definitions” of positive 
terms at the beginning of a tax research paper. an entirely “stable” set of defined 
terms are meaningless because they are outdated as soon as they hit the page. This 
conclusion is strikingly reinforced in the context of tax law because multinational 
firms are constantly “manufacturing” new ideas (i.e., “facts”) to throw at positive 
law theory. so, the theory of positive law must be highly malleable and not fixed in 
order to withstand this “manufacturing” of words in the context of taxation. mach 
and Feyerabend argue the origins of legal theory are in an historical and pluralistic 
account of theory. Preston explained:
Pluralism, [Feyerabend] assures us, affords us our best chance of securing 
knowledge… Knowledge so conceived is an ever-increasing ocean of 
alternatives, each of them forcing others into greater articulation, all of 
them contributing, via this process of competition, to the development of 
our mental faculties.63
The pluralistic idea of science as proposed by Feyerabend allows for science in the 
context of indeterminacy where legal theories are taken as in aggregate comprising 
a composite, pluralistic, view. Knowledge of as many competing legal theories as 
possible is therefore desirable for the lawyer or legal scholar since “facts” are derived 
from legal theory.
5. Legal Science and Indeterminacy
The thesis that tax law is “incomprehensible” was given by Prebble in a series of 
articles and lectures delivered at Vienna university.64 Prebble develops numerous 
specific cases where tax law fails to correspond to the underlying economics of the 
case; with the lack of correspondence, Prebble then arrives at the conclusion that 
tax law is “incomprehensible” and further violates the “rule of law” because it is not 
determinative in positive law terms.65 however, the heuristics of tax law are indeed 
knowable to tax lawyers engaged in the practice of law.66 hence, incoherency does 
63  Preston citing Feyerabend at 5.
64  See Prebble, supra note 26; John Prebble, Ectopia, Tax Law and International Taxation, 5 British Tax 
review 383 (1997). 
65  Prebble & Prebble 1994, at 367.
66  This view of the science of tax law is similar to that given by Prof. nagel for positive science. Feyerabend 
1999, n. 23, at 83 (“Professor nagel… [wrote] ‘the expressions peculiar to a science will possess 
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not preclude positive knowing particularly with the benefit of hindsight. Prebble sets 
out to correspond tax law to economic reality, which he described as the “physical 
facts of the world.”67 This becomes an analogous approach to what Feyerabend 
termed: “naive realis[m]. many scientists and philosophers belong to this group 
[and] assume that there are certain objects in the world and that some theories have 
managed to represent them correctly.”68 The search is for a “pure” theory of law (in 
Kelsenian terms) that also corresponds to economic “reality” which Prebble refers 
to as the “physical facts” or “natural law”; that is, a factual description of taxation 
as analogous to “[s]cientific realism [representing] a general theory of (scientific) 
knowledge… assum[ing] that the world is independent of our knowledge-gathering 
activities and that science is the best way to explore it.”69 
in the context of the philosophy of science, Feyerabend discussed the same issue 
in reference to the positive theory of physics given by albert einstein. einstein’s version 
of positive scientific realism looks like Prebble’s vision of tax law as a Kelsenian version 
of positive economic realism. einstein, as quoted by Feyerabend, wrote as follows:
out of the multitude of our sense experiences we take, mentally and 
arbitrarily, certain repeatedly occurring complexes of sense impressions… and 
correlate to them a concept – the concept of a bodily object. Considered logically 
this concept is not identical with the totality of sense impressions referred to; 
but it is a free creation of the human (animal) mind. on the other hand, this 
concept owes its meaning and its justification exclusively to the totality of the 
sense impressions we associate with it. The second step is to be found in the fact 
that, in our thinking (which determines our expectations), we attribute to this 
concept of a bodily object a significance which is to a high degree independent 
of the sense impressions which originally gave rise to it. This is what we mean 
when we attribute to the bodily object a “real existence”.70
The corollary argument for tax law is that the field of taxation attributes 
significance to the observations of economics to ascertain factual significance for 
application of law. The positive law theory should then be built on the economic 
meanings that are fixed by its own procedures and are therefore intelligible in terms of its own rules 
of usage; whether or not the science has been, or will be [explained in terms of] the other discipline.’”) 
citing e. nagel, The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences in Philosophy of Science 301 (a. Danto & 
s. morgenbesser, eds., new York: World Publishing, 1960).
67  Prebble 1997, at 387 (“The logical separation of the world of physical facts and the world of 
abstract concepts is the fundamental reason for the difficulty of relating income to a particular 
jurisdiction.”).
68  Feyerabend 1981, at 8.
69  Id. at 3. 
70  Id. at 10–11.
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foundations of these sense impressions (e.g., as Prebble argued in the context of 
economics a distinction between “income” versus “capital”).71 Feyerabend applied the 
positive theory given by einstein for the illustration that the system of physics is also 
a construction of the human (qua animal) mind. so, the analogous economic “facts” 
are subjectively given by the scientists in the choosing of the scientific structure; 
thus, Feyerabend’s primary objective is to show “facts” are not transcendent to the 
theory of physics.72 Feyerabend then identifies the differences between mach and 
einstein as follows: “mach differs from the positivists ([einstein’s] version, explained 
above) in two ways: he does not assume a two layer model of knowledge (except 
locally) and he examines the historical (physiological, psychological) determinants 
of scientific change.”73 in simple terms, this means that positive law is constructed by 
human beings as an arbitrary set of knowledge conditions that are not transcendent 
in Kantian terms.74 
The positive science of physics is similar to the positive science of tax law because 
it is a human construct (and not a human measurement of a separate physical world); 
and, again very similar to physics, the problems of the discipline of taxation are not 
set forth in everyday language.75 The idea of law as a human construct is actually 
easier to understand than a transcendent idea of taxation (i.e., taxes as akin to 
absolute space or time). however, it is Feyerabend’s further averment to scientific 
change that becomes particularly important to the positive legal science idea of tax 
law. That is, Feyerabend proposes that science is dynamic, not static. indeed, tax law 
is seemingly always malleable. and, it is exactly the contrary “stability thesis” central 
to Prebble’s claim regarding tax law that Feyerabend next addressed:
any philosopher who holds that scientific theories and other general 
assumptions are nothing but convenient means for the systematization of 
the data of our experience is thereby committed to the view (which i shall 
71  Prebble 1994, at 386 (“The tension between natural law and lawyer’s law is seen in many areas, but 
nowhere so markedly as in the distinction between capital and income… explaining the difference 
between capital income and income items in terms of time illustrates the difficulty of drawing 
a distinction between the two concepts at all.”).
72  Feyerabend 1981, at 13 (“in other words, science explores all aspects of knowledge, ‘phenomena’ as 
well as theories, ‘foundations’ as well as standards; it is an autonomous enterprise not dependent on 
principles taken from other fields.”).
73  Id. 
74  Feyerabend 1999, at 128 (“[T]he new creed generates technical problems of its own which are in no 
way related to specific scientific problems (hume), and how there arises a special subject that codifies 
a science without looking back on it (Kant).”).
75  Id. at 20 (“The problem of the intensity of the gravitational field at a certain location on the earth’s 
surface is not formulated in everyday language – what one doesn’t know, one doesn’t speak about. 
But as soon as the problem is formulated there is the possibility of recruiting an entirely everday 
action… for solving it ‘by observation.’”).
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call the stability thesis) that interpretations do not depend upon the status 
of our theoretical knowledge. our first attack against positivism will consist 
in showing that the stability thesis has undesirable consequences. For this 
purpose it is sufficient to point out that we make assertions not only by 
formulating (with the help of a certain language) a sentence (or a theory) 
and asserting that it is true, but also by using a language as a means of 
communication.76
To briefly summarize, the malleability of words allows for positive science (or, 
in this case, positive law to shift in meaning) is essential for any workable theory of 
science or law. however, as will be discussed in detail here, tax words in comparison 
to general legal words are to a much greater degree not used as everday language. if 
tax words are not part of the ordinary language that could change as usage changed 
over time then we will need to explore other determinants of legal change. science is 
not rigid or “stable” sets of definitions followed by deduction syllogisms;77 however, 
this idea reflects perhaps a common misunderstanding of positive legal science. The 
colloquial idea of positive law as legal science (which may correspond to the theory 
of Bertrand russell)78 appears to be premised on an idea of science as “scientific 
realism” where predictability in legal rules might be achieved through the stability of 
meaning in legal words. This approach is essentially equivalent to what Feyerabend 
referred to as “reductionism.”79 Feyerabend advocated science through a plurality of 
knowledge; “[plural] knowledge so conceived is an ocean of alternatives channeled 
and subdivided by an ocean of standards. it forces our mind to make imaginative 
choices, and thus makes it grow. it makes our mind capable of choosing, imagining, 
criticizing.”80 in any case, pursuant to the linguistic explanation set forth above any 
definition of legal science needs to describe a dynamic (not static) process including 
the potential for the emergence of new “facts” in positive law; in general, the purpose 
of legal theory is to encounter these new “facts” particularly in tax law. 
To simply explain what Feyerabend meant by the “plurality” idea of science, 
the easiest way is to distinguish the “reductionist” idea of scientific realism and the 
76  Feyerabend 1981, at 20.
77  Feyerabend 1999, at 42 (“[epistemological problems] are not solved by proofs, but by decisions, as 
well as by the (empirical or logical) evidence that the decisions are realizable.”).
78  Id. at 41 (“a coherence theory is untenable. it is missing reference to facts, and thus, and this is 
russell’s argument, there must be a language which does not depend on any theory, and this is the 
observation language.”).
79  Id. at 47 (“We must answer russel’s argument… every language is a theoretical language, i.e., 
a language which contains an abstract, detailed, and changeable system of categories, and that the 
observation language is… the sum of all those parts of different theoretical languages now in use, 
of which human individuals can quickly come to a decision which will be unanimous.”).
80  Id. at 184.
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“instrumental” idea of scientific method given by Popper.81 Feyerabend explained 
the distinction as follows:
[one might] den[y] a descriptive function to the sentences of a theory 
and by declaring that these sentences are nothing but parts of a complicated 
prediction machine (instrumentalism), or by conferring upon these sentences 
an interpretation that completely depends upon their connection with the 
observational language as well as upon the (fixed) interpretation of the latter 
(reductionism).82 
simply put, the reductionist idea of legal science corresponds to the inductive 
problem which Popper was trying to address. Feyerabend explained this by reference 
to aristotle where the idea is to inductively verify sets of claims to arrive at truth.83 
Potács concisely explained as follows:
in traditional terms verification of a theory is carried out in accordance 
with the “principle of induction”, which can be inferred from a number of 
individual observations on the accuracy of a general statement. accordingly, 
the verification due to an inductive inference is both a criterion of demarcation 
between “empirical-scientific” and “metaphysical” theories as a methodological 
principle of the empirical sciences.84 
a. The Testing of Legal Theory by Theory
Popper set out to eliminate the metaphysical (i.e., inductive) verification 
element of theory. Popper did this by tearing down rather than building up; that 
is, by identifying what scientists do as falsifying rather than verifying. This focuses 
on using empirical verification to falsify theory based on the observed results. 
Feyerabend gave the “instrumental” terminology for Popper’s method as follows: 
“instrumentalism maintains that the new theory must not be interpreted as a series 
of statements, but that it is rather to be understood as a predictive machine whose 
elements are tools rather than statements and therefore cannot be incompatible 
with any principle already in existence.”85 again, Potács concisely described Popper’s 
falsification method of science:
81  Feyerabend 1999, at 183 (“one answer which is no longer as popular as it used to be is that science 
works by collecting facts and inferring theories from them. The answer is unsatisfactory as theories 
never follow from facts in the strict logical sense.”).
82  Feyerabend 1981, at 52.
83  Feyerabend 1999, at 146 (“The rule that a theory which contradicts experience must be excluded 
from science and replaced by a better theory was invented by aristotle.”).
84  Potács 2015, at sec. B, pt. 3.
85  Feyerabend 1981, at 83.
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The falsification as demarcation criterion means, as i said, that only those 
theories are “not metaphysical” are regarded as “scientific.” The check is 
based on the empirical reality and will refute most theories. such a review 
is carried out by statements about observations of individual events, which 
are called “log records” or “base sets.” This is mainly for the legal rules of 
interpretation of meaning that can be regarded as theories of language 
use. on the applicability of the falsification principle is conceivable as 
a demarcation criterion. accordingly, only those rules of interpretation 
should be recognized as lawful for the interpretation, their acceptance 
and use in the practice of communication can be checked refutable by 
observation. 
Potács then explores whether it is plausible to link Kelsen to Popper as a matter 
of legal theory. obviously, for a german-language legal audience linking Kelsen and 
Popper has extraordinary appeal because it would render legal science a function 
of positive law norms, exclusively. Potács concludes that positive law is based on 
everyday language, but does not constitute “empirical” science; “[a]lthough is now 
the status of the legal doctrine as science largely beyond dispute, if one understands 
science gained under due process of rational knowledge. however, it seems doubtful 
whether the legal doctrine may be regarded as ‘empirical’ science.” Potács then 
quotes Kelsen for legal theory,86 and says that law is built on everyday language with 
the facts and theory implicit.87 he wrote:
natural languages have to a greater uncertainty than formal art languages. 
The importance of formal art languages is determined by fixed rules, 
while on the other hand in natural languages the meaning of expressions 
is characterized by its practical use… [s]ince laws are written in natural 
language, they are also to be interpreted according to the rules in everyday 
language. Because right to use translators to communicate their arrangements 
of natural language, they want to be understood according to the rules of 
natural language.88
86  Potács 2015, at ch. V, sec. a, pt. 1 (“hans Kelsen said as follows: “if within the meaning of philosophical 
positivism may be the subject of a science only the ‘given’, and the given... facts, can the postulate of 
philosophical positivism in provisions no, or at least are not directly applicable, since legal norms are 
no facts but the sense of facts, namely the sense of looking at human behavior as volitional acts”.)
87  Id. (“rather, in particular Karl Popper and hans albert have shown that any form of perception occurs 
because of a theoretical pre-knowledge and is thus ‘bound by theory’ [here, everyday language]. This 
is especially true for everyday observations (e.g., a glass of water), which is always certain theoretical 
ideas (e.g., on certain regular features of a ‘glass’ and ‘water’ in it) require.”).
88  Id. at ch. V, sec. a, pt. 1.
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Potács then goes on to say that the results of legal theory can be observed 
rendering them partially scientific.89 however, the idea of tax terminology as everyday 
language does not seem to be apropos; the practical end result of Potács’ analysis of 
Kelsen, Popper (and alberts) seems to be that law is itself typically everyday language 
and therefore partly scientific to the extent it relies on testable observation; and, 
thereby rejecting ernst mach’s claim that there must be ideas in language beyond 
the everyday usage of language. This would presumably allow for empirical testing 
by falsification under the Popperian conception of science if legal words.90 
simply put, lawyers in a common law jurisdiction apply legal theory to what 
gardner called “gap” situations as a matter of tax planning or in adjudication of tax 
disputes. Where the positive tax law as set forth in the statute and is not sufficient 
then the theory of tax law is the means to resolve the “gap” thereby avoiding the 
potential for “null” results under a strict version of positive law. an obvious illustration 
(as previously given in the tax context) is oiD (original issue discount). if a bond is 
intentionally issued below par value to create built-in gain as opposed to interest, 
thereby changing the applicable tax rate, every tax lawyer in the world ought to 
know that looks like oiD. The oiD term has been codified in many countries including 
the united states.91 in other words, the legislature actually codified the existing 
heuristics of the tax profession (which is what we would expect to see in a healthy 
legal system). of course, that word came from theory where a tax lawyer somewhere 
acted with “intellectual love” to create the terminology of “oiD” which was then 
rightfully incorporated into law. 
and, this process of the codification of tax words happens in a quasi-scientific 
manner as different tax lawyers propose novel means, for example, to deal with 
a discounted bond as a matter of tax practice. such scientific analyses of tax theory 
can be found in law journals. as an example, a Popperian article on discounted 
bonds might say that the understanding of interest/capital gain must be abandoned 
entirely (i.e., falsification) in favor of some other approach to taxation in light of the 
89  Potács 2015, at ch. V, sec. a, pt. 2 (“Decisive for the determination of this ‘will’ of a translator, and thus 
the contents of positive legal norms are thus the rules in everyday language. These rules in everyday 
language can be divided into semantic and pragmatic rules. under semantics is understood here 
linguistic communication with due regard to the usual in the language use of words (word semantics) 
and sets (set semantics).”).
90  Id. at pt. 2 (“so it’s not as if the group referred to Kelsen some sciences (such as the natural or social 
sciences) with ‘facts’ involved and in contrast, the legal doctrine of ‘the sense of facts’ incorporated… 
Between the findings of the natural and social sciences and the legal doctrine in this respect there is 
no difference, because the knowledge of the legal doctrine constitute (legal norms) interpretations of 
sensory perceptions (e.g., texts) in the light of theories (interpretation rules than general statements 
about the use of language). it follows that the findings of the natural and social sciences alike as those 
of legal doctrine ‘not direct observation, but only the understanding accessible’ are… ‘immediate 
perception’ is possible in any of these studies. The legal doctrine is therefore the natural and social 
sciences to the extent ‘empirically equivalent.’”).
91  internal revenue Code, 26 u.s.C. § 1273 (“Determination of original issue Discount”).
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new practice of the issuance of discounted bonds to avoid the payment of interest 
which renders the prior theory incoherent. another article might say that a new 
auxiliary concept (such as oiD) can be incorporated into the theory of “interest” 
known by tax lawyers to augment the existing theory of interest/capital gains. in 
any case, the factual content of the word “interest” is subject to change based on the 
heuristics and practices of the tax profession which we call the “theory” of taxation. 
The evolution of such legal theory is similar to the evolution of scientific theory. 
6. Conclusion
mach/Feyerabend factual indeterminacy refers to the first identification of 
a situation that cannot be expressed under the existing framework of tax words. 
an obvious historical example might be a limited liability company defined as 
a partnership for tax purposes under the laws of the united Kingdom, but which is 
treated as a corporation in the netherlands. of course, this eventually came to be 
known as a “hybrid” entity for purposes of tax theory, likewise new circumstances 
eventually gave rise to the term “reverse-hybrid”, and so forth. notably, once the 
new words (i.e., hybrid, reverse-hybrid) exist it is still possible to have general factual 
indeterminacy under the tax law, but at least the word-categories exist to formulate 
a decision about the “facts.” This example should further illustrate that the proposal 
everyday language would suffice for tax law is clearly unsatisfactory; such an idea 
is ostensibly inapplicable in the tax context (i.e., since as an example “hybrid” now 
actually refers to a car in colloquial language). 
The phenomenon of mach/Feyerabend factual indeterminacy is of further 
significance to international tax law for at least the following three reasons. First, 
an additional answer can be given to the Fitzmaurices in the repeated criticisms 
of the (non-positivist) common law of taxation. For example, if a strict positive law 
were applied to a previously unknown form of legal entity (i.e., a “limited liability 
company”) the tax classification of that entity would be automatically subjective as 
explained by Feyerabend; at the minimum, legal entity classification would then 
be determined under rule 1, 2, 3, and so on, in the manner akin to that given by 
linderfalk under interpretation of the Vienna Convention. But, in the case of an 
interpretational rule of original legislative intent, the positive law could potentially 
be more subjective than a form of legal realism under the common law. indeed, 
there is no possibility of achieving legal coherence where identification of original 
legislative intent cannot operate because the category of “fact” did not exist when 
the law was drafted. 
second, the importation of words from economics cannot remove incoherency 
from the field of taxation. Take the example of an economic profit. each of wages, 
capital gains, even gifts might meet the condition of the economic word “profit”; note 
further that inflation is typically not considered economic profit (yet it is taxable). 
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Where a common law court encounters a question of measuring “taxable income” 
it actually cannot use the economic definition of profit (even the haig-simons 
definition) without incorporating some (or even all) aspects of economic theory. 
so, economic “fact” words like “profit” cannot simply be substituted even for exactly 
the same word if that word happened to appear in the positive law. as Feyerabend 
explained, this is a nonsensical proposal for tax law; the “factual” meaning of words 
must be determined by the operation of the legal theory of taxation just as in any 
other area of the law. accordingly, the idea of “profit” as a “fiction” (and weakness of 
the tax system) as Prebble stressed is not helpful as a matter of legal theory;92 to the 
contrary, such flexibility in encountering new situations with shifts in the meaning 
of words is a fundamental aspect of any legal (or scientific) system. 
Third, with mach/Feyerabend factual indeterminacy the importance of the gaar 
to tax systems becomes rather obvious. in the situation where a new “fact” word 
arises, as under a codified system of tax law, such would automatically create an 
“interpretational” dilemma for strict positive law systems in particular.93 The gaar 
then becomes appealing where legal theory has been partially excluded from the 
law under a positive law framework.
in conclusion, legal theory functions in much the same manner as scientific 
theory. Tax lawyers function as clinicians of taxpayer behavior and with practical 
knowledge are in position to derive legal theory (and, to test it). Potács provided an 
extensive explanation of the limits of the falsification method vis-à-vis Popperian 
theory for positive legal science. a further limitation of the Popperian theory of 
scientific method was given by Feyerabend in that even falsified theories still 
contribute new concepts to science. Perhaps the most important lesson from the 
philosophy of science with respect to tax law is Feyerabend’s link between “facts” 
and theory. he wrote: “[T]he descriptions of the observable facts contradict a theory 
often only because the concepts with which they were formulated belong to 
older theories. in this case, the contradiction is not between theory and ‘fact,’ but 
between newer theory and older theory.”94 accordingly, the idea of “naïve scientific 
realism” previously offered as critique of tax law as “fictions” (reflecting the idea 
that legal theory does not properly reflect economics “facts”) radically understates 
the fundamental importance of legal theory to tax law. For example, if legal theory 
were found not to correspond to “economic reality” in a given situation this reflects 
merely a difference as between legal theory and economic theory and accordingly 
not a misapplication of economic “facts” by lawyers.
92  Prebble 1994, at 387.
93  See Judith Freedman, GAAR as a Process and the Process of Discussing the GAAR, 1 British Tax review 
22 (2012).
94  Feyerabend 1999, at 169.
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